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Anja Matwijkiw, Gary, Indiana/USA* & Bronik Matwijkiw, Cape Girardeau, Missouri/USA** 
 
Stakeholder Jurisprudence: The New Way in Human Rights† 
 
Abstract: Making use of United Nations (U.N.) materials and documents, Anja Matwijkiw and Bronik 
Matwijkiw argue that the organization – in 2004 – converted to a stakeholder jurisprudence for human 
rights. However, references to “stakeholders” may both be made in the context of narrow stakeholder 
theory and broad stakeholder theory. Since the U.N. does not specify its commitment by naming the theory 
it credits for its conversion, the authors of the article embark on a comparative analysis, so as to be able 
to try the two frameworks for fit. The hypothesis is that it is the philosophy and methodology of broad 
stakeholder theory that best matches the norms and strategies of the U.N. While this is the case, certain 
challenges nevertheless present themselves. As a consequence of these, the U.N. has to – as a minimum – 
take things under renewed consideration. 
Keywords: stakeholder theory, human rights, jurisprudence, international law, United Nations 
 
I. From Stakeholder Terminology to Stakeholder Theory 
Concerning human rights and the United Nations (U.N.), it is indisputable that the organization 
has instituted a New Way in general jurisprudence, construed as a set of criteria for officially 
correct interpretation of the relevant parts of international law.
1 Historically speaking, it is also 
indisputable that the New Way can be traced back to former Secretary -General Kofi A. Annan’s 
2004-Report to the Security Council, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and 
Post-Conflict Societies.
2 Rather than simply talk about human right -holders and corresponding 
duty-bearers in terms of individuals, groups, peoples, countries and states, Annan refers expressly 
to “stakeholders”.
3 Furthermore, it appears that stakeholders are differentiated on the basis of 
“interests”  and  “goals”  which,  in  turn,  establish  “constituencies”.
4  For  example,  European 
Christians and Arabic Muslims may belong to the same (stakeholder) constituency through the 
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2 Kofi A. Annan,  The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, U.N. Doc. 
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3 Annan (note 2), 6-9. 
4 Idem.  
2 
fact that they both perceive the realization of non-discriminatory practices in the political domain 
as  important.  Consequently,  status  as  stakeholders  is  independent  of  culture,  nationality  and 
religion, and for that matter, all other characteristics that can be used to describe the European 
Christians and Arabic Muslims, who have a common stake in the kind of equality in question. It 
follows that the stakeholder terminology, in one sense, functions as an analogy to the way in 
which  human  rights  already  apply  under  the  auspices  of  the  U.N.,  namely  irrespective  of 
contingent  facts,  such  as  culture,  nationality  and  religion.  However,  a  dis-analogy  arises  on 
account of the stakeholder terminology’s transformative potential in so far as the implied interests 
may go beyond those that are protected by the existing body of international human rights norms. 
As a matter of right, an increase in equality may be the goal and, for this reason, the implied 
change may also create a mismatch with representative democracy, as well as any other form of 
government that is currently covered by the articles that specify the conditio sine qua non for 
participatory  politics.
5  Talk about stakeholders, therefore, may be a way of transcending the 
status quo and, at the same time , raising the bar. That granted, stakeholders are not necessarily 
gaining a direct advantage for themselves. As it happens, stakeholders may be change-facilitators 
for others because without “their progress”, our own security in terms of fully recognized and 
protected  rights  could  be  threatened.  What  is  more,  there  are  different  opinions  about  the 
legitimacy of interests and, by extension, about stakeholders. This goes to show, of course, that 
the use of the stakeholder terminology is not neutral. Instead, it is determined by theory. Here it 
should  be  noted  that  two  main  types  can  be  distinguished,  respectively  narrow  and  broad 
stakeholder theory. 
Given that Annan and his administration updated the conceptual framework of the U.N. by 
adopting  the  stakeholder  terminology  without  stating  anything  about  a  narrow  or  broad 
affiliation, the organization’s application is naïve to the extent that the narrow/broad distinction 
reflects a difference of substance. Notwithstanding, the U.N. appears to borrow primarily from 
the methodology and philosophy of broad stakeholder theory.
6  
                                                           
5 According to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, direct democracy is also an option. In either 
case, the right to vote is restricted to citizens, whereas advocates of an increase in equality may argue that, inter alia, 
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Stakeholder theory.  
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In  the  opinion  of  the  two  authors  of  this  article,  the  above  hypothesis  is  empirically 
verifiable on the basis of a comparison of, on the one hand, the two kinds of stakeholder theory 
and, on the other hand, the norms of the U.N. 
While the New Way can be shown to match the main premises of broad stakeholder theory, 
certain challenges remain. Some of these are internal. Others are external, although these too are 
bound to have consequences for the U.N.’s image. For example, it is a fact that broad stakeholder 
theorists – in 2010 – took steps towards value minimalism. The U.N., therefore, has to engage in 
critical reflection that aims at asking crucial questions, such as whether the organization should 
choose another jurisprudence path. After all, stakeholder theory functions as a set of guidelines 
or, borrowing the vocabulary of Lon L. Fuller, direction posts. The additional fact that Annan’s 
successor  as  Secretary-General,  Ban  Ki-Moon,  talks  more  frequently  and  elaborately  about 
stakeholders  than  he  himself  did  during  his  leadership,  makes  the  need  for  answers  rather 
pressing.
7 
But, first things first. Before presenting the possible reasons for a discontinuation of the 
U.N.’s stakeholder way, an account of the two theoretical outlooks is necessary. As for this, it 
should be emphasized that both narrow and broad stakeholder theory was designed, developed 
and defended in the context of business management, with a particular view to recommending 
effective strategies for the purpose of accomplishing the mission of a given firm or corporation. 
Furthermore, because broad stakeholder theory is, at least in part, advanced as an alternative to its 
narrow counterpart, it makes sense to begin with the various  assumptions that enlighten and 
guide  narrow  stakeholder  theory  and,  thereafter,  proceed  to  broad  stakeholder  theory  while 
highlighting those components that create the most contrast. 
 
II. Narrow Stakeholder Theory 
Typically,  narrow  stakeholder  theorists  subscribe  to  the  classical  model  of  Corporate  Social 
Responsibility  (CSR).  Therefore,  like  Milton  Friedman,  narrow  stakeholder  theorists  take  a 
radical “market-based approach”.
8 This precludes a “public good” defense of market regulation 
because such a strategy violates the separation of business and government which, in turn, is the 
axiomatic  premise  for  laissez-faire  capitalism  as  opposed  to  socialism  as  an  instance  of 
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8 R. Edward Freeman et al, Stakeholder Theory: The State of the Art, 2010, 29.  
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totalitarianism.
9 As a consequence, the pursuit of profit cannot be immoral. To the contrary, it is a 
measure for failed state prevention. If private for -profit businesses, be they small firms or large 
corporations, are not allowed to compete with each other, the implied loss of freedom translates 
into oppression and tyranny (cf. socialism as an instance of totalitarianism). Another consequence 
consists in the incommensurability of freedom and welfare, meaning that the ideal political 
system presents itself as the so-called minimal state that functions to “protect our freedom both 
from the enemies outside our gates and from our fellow-citizens…[and to] preserve law and 
order”,  in  addition  to  maintaining  the  marketplace.
10  Although  the  marketplace  is  internally 
directed by four impersonal forces, namely the freedom to rank-order wants so as to establish 
preferences, the freedom to bargain and contract without intervention, the freedom to buy and/or 
sell products or services at a price that is negotiated and settled by the parties to the transaction, 
and  the  freedom  to  pursue  one’s  own  self-interest  as  an  individual,  the  underlying  structure 
restricts participation in that same marketplace, in accordance with affordability.  
It follows that recognition and, ipso facto, status as stakeholders is reserved for people with 
monetary interests at stake. That granted, it is important to stress that there are primary and 
secondary stakeholders.  Within the constituency of traditional market  participants,  owners of 
stock or shares are ascribed primacy in comparison to everybody else because the continued 
survival of a business depends on their investment.
11 Given that the assumption is that the means 
of production are privately owned (cf. capitalism), it is also true to say that stockholders are the 
parties with the most at stake. For this reason, they are owed m ore consideration than all other 
stakeholders, be they internal (e.g., workers and their salary) or external ones (e.g., consumers 
who are assumed to have access to alternatives in a marketplace that bans monopolies). 
As agents for stockholders, managers are cut off from any conceivable conflicts of interest. 
On the premises of narrow stakeholder theory, CSR boils down to a fiduciary obligation to 
conduct the affairs of the business in accordance with the desire of the stockholders which, 
following Friedman, “typically is to make as much money as possible”.
12 That which is necessary 
for  this  goal  is  also  that  which  is  fair  or  just.  For  example,  if  profit-maximization  entails 
maximization  of  productivity  and  efficiency  and,  with  this,  rationalization  of  the  production 
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to Increase Its Profits, New York Times Magazine, September 13, 1970, (reprinted) in Joseph R. DesJardins and 
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mode, then this strategic measure should be implemented regardless of the consequences to blue-
collar employees and their (alleged) “rights” to work, to unionize, to collective bargaining, to 
strike, etc. Such socialist norms undermine the fabric of a free society by forcing businesses to 
associate and assemble with third parties they would have preferred not to engage in discussion 
and conflict-resolution with, if they had had a choice. Even if critics enter social utility as a stake 
in the narrow entitlement equation, managers continue to be bound by their internal and exclusive 
constituency. After all, managers are hired by the business and not the government. This does not 
mean  that  public  officials  are  encouraged  to  impose  utilitarianism  as  a  measurement  for 
businesses. As a position that makes sacrificing the rights of individuals both permissible and 
required,  utilitarianism  is  just  as  totalitarian  as  socialism.  This  is  one  reason  why  narrow 
stakeholder theory dismisses a public good defense of market regulation. Another has to do with 
the belief that an aggressive growth and expansion philosophy, however short-term, will in fact 
benefit the majority of citizens, inter alia, through private job creation (cf. the so-called trickle-
down effect). 
In the process of putting business interests above all other claims to consideration, managers 
have to, however, accept three “rules of the game”, that is, for “Doing Business as Usual” (cf. 
profit-maximization).
13 First, they should obey the law of the sta te. Second, they should avoid 
fraud and deception. And, third, managers are expected to respect ethical customs. That said, 
some commentators object that the players are given mixed signals. The theoretical dynamics are 
such that managers, in addition to the duty to avoid fraud and deception, can be said to have a 
“responsibility to ‘push the envelope’ of legality in pursuit of profits”.
14 It follows that business 
scandals  are  failed  attempts  to  secure  a  monetary  gain  in  a  way  that  falls  within  narrowly 
construed legal margins. As a consequence of the implied pressure to “get it right”, pushing the 
envelope manifests itself as a matter of risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis rather than a 
matter of ethics. That said, if “Everybody is doing it” as a matter of business practice, no (moral) 
crime has been committed. 
Although the narrow for-profit paradigm is consistent with legal positivism, there is an in-
built tension. Respect for the law and “pushing the envelope of legality” are mutually exclusive 
on the premises of the general jurisprudence position in question. Furthermore, judges are more 
likely than not to protect risk-takers because of the strict hands-off policy that follows in the 
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wake of the separation of business and government, as endorsed by narrow stakeholder theory. 
Since a penumbra-ruling will be a question of making new law rather than following the law that 
is, positivist-minded judges can hardly be said to have an incentive to, as it were, inflict an 
opinion that discords with the ideological climate. 
To further protect against undue interference, morality imputes distinctions that not only 
translate  into  relativism  (cf.  respect  for  customs),  but  also  subjectivism.
15  Applied to the 
marketplace, the two positions entail that “There should not be any censorship of preferences”. 
To allow some preferences and not others is tantamount to withholding freedom of thought and, 
more generally speaking, autonomy from individuals or groups of individuals with whom the 
powerful rulers happen to disagree. 
No matter how much a representative democracy preaches inclusiveness, it cannot rival the 
marketplace. This functions as a strategy for emancipation in terms of self-determination.
16 In this 
way, the marketplace is a testimony for plurality and against uniformity. However different, each 
individual is in a position to pursue what he most wants, whereas talk about needs is for arrogant 
politicians, who issue decrees that are (allegedly) “ethically justified” by paternalism. The last-
mentioned position not only clashes with relativism and subjectivism whereby needs are treated 
as subcategories of wants; it is also in conflict with classical liberalism as a way that maximizes 
freedom as long as actions do not inflict harm on other people or deprive them of their equal 
freedom.  That  granted,  the  two  restrictions,  which  summarize  the  traditional  Principle  of 
Individual Responsibility, are pushed toward an extreme pro-autonomy notion in so far as ethics 
violations, in the final analysis, amount to instances of freedom-deprivation, that is, to either 
interference with the perception of harm – for me (cf. subjectivism) or to interference with the 
perception of harm – for us (cf. relativism).
17 The point is that it is inappropriate, if not offensive, 
to purport to know what is in the best interest of others. Furthermore, it is equally offensive to 
make others financially responsible for oneself or for extensions of oneself (cf. family), to make 
strangers pay for, say, one’s healthcare through mandatory taxation. By definition, therefore, non-
paying  consumers  must  be  disqualified  from  any  stakeholder  constituency.  What  is  more, 
mandatory  taxation  violates  the  marketplace  strategy  for  interaction  and  transaction,  viz. 
voluntary cooperation.
18 After this, the worst-off are advised to make (better) use of the same 
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18 Ibid., at 13, 33.  
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opportunity that everybody else relies on, namely open competition on the basis of skills. On the 
premises of narrow stakeholder theory, the marketplace is a meritocracy that, therefore, will pay 
monetary compensation in accordance with desert, as measured either on the basis of risk or 
effort.  
With self-sufficiency as the logical corollary to self-determination, the destiny of economic 
and social rights is determined beforehand, with the exception of claims that translate into market 
freedoms. Philosophically and methodologically, narrow stakeholder theory is geared towards the 
kind of rights-analysis that emphasizes discretionary powers, thereby equating rights stricto sensu 
with status as, borrowing the words of Herbert L.A. Hart, a “small-scale sovereign”.
19 Exercising 
his power, the small-scale sovereign in effect controls the correlative duties which, analytically 
speaking, are prior to the rights (cf. the correlativity thesis).
20 In the event of scarcity, however, 
there is no freedom to choose to have one’s right fulfilled by enforcing the duty to render aid and 
assistance. Even if the resources are available here and now at time T, the circumstances may 
change tomorrow.
21 To talk about “freedom from want” as a matter of right is simply nonsense. 
As a general premise, it holds that economics determine ethics, that is, which rights can exist in 
reality (cf. economic realism). 
In the light of this, Friedman’s position can be classified as libertarianism for the following 
reasons. First, wrong-doing is tantamount to interference with the freedom of others since there is 
no objective standard for harm (or related concepts, i.e., need and best interest), a fact which can 
also  be  extended  to  utilitarianism  and  which  therefore  makes  it,  if  possible,  even  more 
inexcusable to violate the rights of stockholders for generalized consideration. Besides market 
freedoms, the rights-terminology is limited to civil/political rights and, even more narrowly for 
basic rights, to life, liberty and security as negative rights on condition that the arrangement is the 
outcome  of  voluntary  corporation.  The  point  is  that  meta-rights  to  negotiate  the  terms  for 
transaction in accordance with preferences and with a mutual benefit in mind must always be 
accommodated.
22  Consequently, the separation  of law and morality is sharp and significant. 
                                                           
19 Herbert L. A. Hart, Bentham on Legal Rights, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 1973, 192. 
20 The correlativity thesis alone says that “In order for A to have a claim-right, there must – as a logically necessary 
condition  –  exist  at  least  one  other  person  or  party,  B,  who  has  a  duty  toward  A”.  See  Joel  Feinberg,  Social 
Philosophy, 1973, 61. 
21 Ibid., 84-97. 
22 Milton Friedman and Rose D. Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement, 1979, xv, 3.  
Making a mutual benefit the goal of a transaction is not inconsistent with the pursuit of rational self-interest as a 
market  force.  It  is,  per  Adam  Smith’s  words,  “my  own  gain”  that  motivates  the  action  of  each  party  in  the 
marketplace. While there, the individual is not alone, though. Being two instead of one, the assumption is that no  
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Second,  even  if  (market  and  civil/political)  rights  translate  into  a  compatriot  version  of  the 
concentric-circle conception, meaning that it is nationality that ultimately sanctions the rights in 
question (cf. legal positivism), the state or government has no jurisdiction over the assets that 
belong to individual citizens. A redistribution of resources is wrong. Consequently, the issue of 
freedom versus welfare boils down to a dichotomy between justice (= a capitalist free society) 
and injustice (= a socialist welfare state). Within the minimal state, the arrangement coincides 
with the program of privatization, deregulation and decentralization (with the exception of laws 
that maintain the free marketplace). Regarding inter-state affairs, the commitment may be either 
to  self-defense  in  the  event  of  an  attack  or  to  a  preemptive  strike.  National  Security  is  not 
necessarily  consistent  with  peace  although  this  is  the  ultimate  goal  because  only  peace  is 
conducive to “our continued survival, being who we are”. Whether “they”, that is, the enemy also 
secure  their  post-conflict  existence  is  not  our  concern  or,  perhaps  more  to  the  point,  “our 
business”. The point is that dominion and imperialist conquest is consistent with  the narrow 
paradigm. 
 
III. Broad Stakeholder Theory 
Whether the adversarial zero-sum game is played within politics or business, exponents of broad 
stakeholder theory criticize it as being counterproductive from the point of view of pragmatism, 
arguing that diplomatic conflict-resolution offers a long-term protective measure by minimizing, 
if  not  eliminating,  threats  to  social  viability  through  revenge-taking,  which  then  calls  for 
retaliation, in principium ad infinitum (thereby creating a perpetual state of war).
23 For the same 
reason, broad stakeholder theo ry emphasizes compromise, just as it presupposes a notion of 
interdependency.
24 At the level of idealism, interdependency also functions to explain why all 
interests are, at least as a starting point, treated as equal and, consequently, deserving of the same 
consideration. In this way, CSR or, to broaden the application scope, the responsibility of 
leadership in general consists, first and foremost, in the duty to balance the different interests of 
the different stakeholder constituencies, with a specific view to benefiting everybody.
25 However, 
in the event of a conflict, external stakeholders may present themselves as the primary ones, 
although they have no monetary interests at stake. The rationale for this owes, in part, to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
exchange, that is interaction in the form of transaction, will take place until both parties are satisfied.  
23 R. Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach [SM], 1984), 19. 
24 Ibid., at 58, 75. 
25 Ibid., at 53, 57.  
Note that the benefit is expressed in terms of need-satisfaction. See ibid., at 75.  
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definition  of  the  single  most  central  concept,  namely  that  of  stakeholders.  According  to  the 
premises of the broad stakeholder theory, it holds that anyone who affects or is affected by the 
activities of X, be it a business or a large-scale social entity, such as a nation state, qualifies as a 
stakeholder.
26  But,  because  the  legitimacy  of  the  implied  interests  is  measured  by  their 
importance which, in turn, is rank-ordered by basicness from the point of view of humanity (cf. 
humanism), the idea and indeed ideology of granting virtually unrestricted freedom in return for 
an absence of security in the form of recognition and protection of economic/social human rights 
to,  among  other  things,  nutritious  food,  unpolluted  water  and  adequate  clothing  should  be 
dismissed.  Using  the  logic  of  extensionality  for  an  account  of  basic  (human)  needs,  broad 
stakeholder theorists can also show that while non-basic (cultural and/or individual) needs – just 
like  basic  needs  –  may  assume  certain  absolutist  features,  only  the  last-mentioned  count  as 
invariant facts genetically speaking, meaning that the ultimate source of the needs in question is 
universal and objective necessities, as opposed to wants (cf. cultural needs) or special conditions 
for  functioning  (cf.  individual  needs).
27  Furthermore, advocates o f broad stakeholder theory 
endorse a distinction between, on the one hand, conventional and individual morality, and, on the 
other  hand,  morality  proper.  More  precisely,  they  argue  that  in  order  to  be  deemed  ethical, 
relativism and subjectivism and, for that matter, utilitarianism must not jeopardize conformity 
with the fundamental principles that help generate human rights on the basis of an assumption of 
the  intrinsic  value  or  worth  of  humanity  simpliciter,  i.e.,  humanity  as  a  concept  that  is 
unmediated by rationality and autonomy. In addition to the Harm Principle, the broad stakeholder 
theory lists the Respect Principle, which prescribes that “You should treat others as ends, and not 
merely  as  means”.
28  As  a  consequence,  the  weight-scales  are,  once  again,  tilted  in  favor  of 
welfare, a fair minimum wage, non-exploitative practices, etc., although such measures do not 
have to be at the expense of freedom. As alluded to earlier, the nature of the relationship between 
economic/social  human  rights  and  civil/political  human  rights  is  complex.  Welfare  affects 
freedom,  but  freedom  also  affects  welfare  to  the  extent  that  this  is  causally  connected  with 
outcomes.  For  example,  the  system  may  obstruct  choices  that  would  otherwise  promote  an 
                                                           
26 Ibid., at 25. 
27 David Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth, 1998, 10. 
28 William M. Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian Capitalism, 
in Ethical Theory and Business, 3rd ed. 1988, 100-103. 
Note that while the Harm Principle is adopted from John Stuart Mill, the Respect Principle overlaps with Immanuel 
Kant’s, Principle of Humanity. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in On Liberty and Other Essays, ed. John Gray, 
1991, 104-128; Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. Mary Gregor, 1998, 36-38  
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individual’s social/economic security. That granted, serious challenges remain in the marketplace 
where affordability prevails as the narrow access criterion. In the case of the media and election 
campaigns, having to pay money for broadcasting time (disrespectfully) cancels the rights of poor 
candidates. Yet another challenge, which draws on the link between freedom and recognizing 
others as ends in their own right, pertains to a strict law and order society. On the premises of 
broad stakeholder theory, this is inseparable from a failed state by virtue of restricting freedom 
too much. However, such a conclusion imputes no de-emphasis on welfare as a justice issue. 
Accusations of state-sanctioned terrorism would be denied by liberals and libertarians outside the 
domain of life, liberty and security as traditionally interpreted, but the existence of a class society 
that implements a strategy of economic violence would suffice as counterproof. Given that the 
harm  is  inflicted  by  the  structures  of  society,  the  Principle  of  Individual  Responsibility  is 
inadequate for the same reason. The Principle of State Responsibility should also be made to 
matter. Broadening the premise of interdependency to the global state of affairs, transnational 
duties present themselves whenever a given nation state is unable and/or unwilling to respond to 
the fair demands of its own citizenry. If one of the building blocks that comprise the international 
society collapses, the relevant state failure may adversely affect everybody else. As far as rights 
are  concerned,  however,  these  require  appropriate  intentions.  Therefore,  in  the  process  of 
rendering aid and assistance, the leadership has to accommodate Neil MacCormick’s Modern 
Version of the Interest Theory of Rights whereby the concept of a benefit is not a sufficient 
condition  to  constitute a claim-right.  After this,  it holds that the object  of a right  must also 
promote  the  good  of  the  intended  beneficiary  as  an  end.  Therefore,  in  addition  to  harm-
avoidance, rights-recognition incorporates respect.
29 Whether it is practically possible to fulfill 
the correlative duties in the real world is something that depends on the circumstances, but this 
consideration is post facto. It cannot affect rights-recognition. The broader point is that references 
to economic realism are not driven by logic but instead by ideology.
30 For the same reason, the 
                                                           
29 Neil MacCormick, Legal Right and Social Democracy, 1982, 154-166. 
30 The Modern Interest Theory of Rights not only refutes the  analytical correlativity thesis but also the doctrine that 
rights, for their existence, depend on the practical possibility of their fulfillment. Narrow stakeholder theory proceeds 
as if there is a synthesis between the two views, more precisely, as if the analytical correlativity thesis commits 
theorists  to  economic  realism.  In  turn,  the  alleged  synthesis  constitutes  the  basis  for  the  distinction  between 
civil/political  rights  and  economic/social  rights  in  terms  of  negative  and  positive  rights.  Realists  and 
liberals/libertarians alike either preclude economic/social rights or make these secondary because they are positive 
whereas civil/political rights are real or primary because they are negative. Logically, however, this is untenable. It 
does not make sense to argue that duties are prior to rights. If anything, rights are reasons for duties as consequences.  
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incommensurability hypothesis that follows, that it is not possible to secure both freedom and 
welfare, can be dispelled as a narrow anti-humanitarian myth. 
The  criteria  that  underpin  broad  stakeholder  theorists’  approach  preclude  totalitarianism, 
welfare-oppressive versions of capitalism and unethical forms of socialism. The latter is to say 
that if the object of social/economic human rights is not provided for the right reason, i.e., for the 
sake of the right-holders themselves, welfare reduces to a form of degradation of the value of 
humanity.  At  the  same  time,  belonging  among  the  most  important  cum  basic  rights,  it  is 
impermissible to not provide the object of social/economic human rights to others unless those 
others participate in the decision.
31 On the one hand, therefore, the premise is that all stakeholders 
have inalienable rights, thereby making the implicit social contract consistent with natural law 
theory. On the other hand, however, that same conclusion is counteracted by a notion of balanced 
judgment which is consistent with authorizing (self -regarding) basic rights-violations, thereby 
creating a serious theoretical tension. 
 
IV. From Business Management to International Law 
The link between the different types of stakeholder theory and business management is thought-
provoking for a number of reasons. Besides the controversies that appear in the course of analysis 
and which arguably point to deep-rooted philosophical and methodological differences, some 
commentators  may  argue  that  the  adoption  of  a  framework  that  derives  from  the  for-profit 
domain misfires in the case of a not-for-profit organization like the U.N. which – according to its 
own mission statement – works to promote “peace and security for mankind”.
32 Setting that aside 
for the moment, the next question is whether the premises that best match the declared human 
rights, goals and strategies of the U.N. fall under narrow or, alternatively, broad stakeholder 
theory. This is important. Unless cognizant of the correct interpretation of international law, U.N. 
managers cannot be expected to conduct the affairs of the global partnership in the way that they 
should while acting in their professional capacity. However, while the U.N.’s commitment can 
only be identified indirectly, the organization can nevertheless be shown to be taking sides in a 
sufficiently unambiguous and convincing manner to substantiate the claim that the New Way 
                                                           
31 William M. Evan and R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian Capitalism, 
in Ethical Theory and Business, ed. T. Beauchamp and N. Bowie, 4
th ed., 1993, 75-93, reprinted in DesJardins and 
McCall (note 9) [CIBE], 76-84, at 79. 
32 Memorandum on G.A. Res. 177 (II),  The Charter and Judgment of the Nűrnberg Tribunal: History and Analysis 
[CJNT], U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/5 (March 3,1949), 11.  
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constitutes a broad stakeholder jurisprudence, if only in a rudimentary form, subject to further 
conceptual and normative evolution in the future. 
Transferring  the  narrow/broad  comparison  to  the  U.N.,  the  following  points  warrant 
attention. First, the relevant body of norms is consistent with both capitalism and socialism, or a 
combination of these (cf. mixed market economy) according to the parts of the group-right to 
self-determination whereby all peoples may “freely pursue their economic, social [and cultural] 
development” and, furthermore, “freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources”.
33  
That granted, some individual rights imply certain political-economic principles, inter alia, 
the right to own property and not to be arbitrarily deprived of it; the right to work and to be free 
to choose employment; to enjoy trade union protection against a powerful employer, private or 
public;  and  to  be  protected  against  unemployment  or  its  consequences.  Consequently, 
international  law  tests  negative  to  laissez-faire  economics.  It  contains  not  only  limitations 
precluding  government  from  invading  civil/political  rights,  but  positive  obligations  for 
government to promote economic/social rights, a broad cum comprehensive conception in other 
words.  Citing  article  22  of  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  the  realization  of 
economic/social  rights  is  “indispensable”  for  the  dignity  of  the  human  person  and  the  free 
development  of  his  personality.
34  Furthermore, just like  customary international law (cf. the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights), international treaty law (cf. the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)) presupposes the doctrine of interdependency and, expressis verbis, 
links dignity with membership of “the human family”.
35 While speciesism is inconsistent with the 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant, it is still correct to say that credentials-checking for basic rights in 
terms of human rights entails the Respect Principle, as advanced by the Modern Interest Theory 
of  Rights.  Furthermore,  regarding  basic  needs,  prominent  legal  scholars  argue  that  these  are 
reasons why the implicit social contract applies to international law, in addition to national law.
36 
That said, some rights founded on basic needs belong to the class of civil/political rights and not 
economic/social  rights.  This  is  true of, for example, the right  not  to  be tortured. To subject 
terrorists to water boarding may be an effective interrogation method that serves the common 
                                                           
33 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR], U.N. Doc. A/6316 (December 16, 
1966), at article 1(1)(2). 
34 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR], U.N. Doc A/810 (1948), 71. 
35 ICCPR (note 5), at Preamble; ICESCR (note 33), at Preamble. 
36 Louis Henkin et al, Human Rights, 1999, 285.  
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good, but such a utilitarian argument ignores the stake in humanity simpliciter which is what 
matters pertaining to justice at the level of rights-recognition. 
Notwithstanding, international law makes room for utilitarianism, in addition to the idea of 
individual  human  rights.  Social  utility,  however,  cannot  trump  dignity  because  social  utility, 
again expressis verbis, merely restricts the “exercise of rights”.
37 The time that philosophers have 
devoted to the task of resolving the “conflict” could have been saved if they had realized the 
Ultimate Logical Implication of the analysis of rights, namely the distinction between rights-
recognition and rights-protection, which the broad stakeholder theory relies upon. From the point 
of  view  of  rights-recognition,  utilitarianism  misses  the  mark.  On  a  more  positive  note, 
utilitarianism  is  a  tool  for  the  promotion  of  the  modern  welfare  state.  Consequently,  it  is 
unwarranted to argue that there is no benefit for the individual under that type of teleological 
ethics simply because the collective state of affairs is not accomplished for the sake of  that 
particular individual. 
As it happens, international hard law reconfirms the unconditional basic rights-conception 
whereby rights-recognition and rights-protection must be separated in the case of economic/social 
rights. Under the ICESCR, the existence of these rights is not mediated by real-world facts about 
resources and fulfillment. This does not mean that the U.N. is legally or ethically unconcerned 
about  whether  the  right-holders  receive  the  goods  which  the  rights  entitle  them  to.  To  the 
contrary, the notion of duties plays a central role in conjunction with rights-protection through its 
promissory language on behalf of the states parties. The ICESCR states that: 
  
Each  State  Party  to  the  present  Covenant  undertakes  to  take  steps,  individually  and  through  international 
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a 
view  to  achieving  progressively  the  full  realization  of  the  rights  recognized  in  the  present  Covenant  by  all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
38 
 
The  steps  in  question  cover  all  aspects  of  rights-protection,  from  implementation  into 
national law, to enforcement in national as well as international law, and fulfillment. Aiming at 
full realization, furthermore, social/economic rights generate obligations to provide individuals 
with the substance of the relevant rights in accordance with the circumstances. If the goal, that is, 
                                                           
37 ICCPR (note 5), at articles 21 and 22(2).  
Note that the rights not to be subjected to torture, genocide and slavery are exempt. See ibid., at article 4(2). 
38 ICESCR (note 33), at article 2(1).  
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rights-fulfillment, cannot be realized here and now at time T (and the assumption is that it cannot 
in many places), human rights generate – in the second instance – obligations to try to create, step 
by step and through specific programs, the conditions whereby it becomes possible (in the future) 
to give people that to which the rights are rights. It is these instrumental meta-obligations which 
are intrinsic to the ICESCR’s notion of programmatic obligations.
39 
The synthesis of civil/political and economic/social rights is something that pushes towards a 
double-aspect  notion  of  peace,  security  and  justice.  In  stakeholder  terms,  the  law  combines 
narrow freedom and broad welfare. At the same time, the Bifurcation Principle that conceptually 
separates  civil/political  rights  and  economic/social  rights  is  a  uniquely  narrow  feature. 
Furthermore,  the  measures  of  protection  that  accompany  economic/social  rights  are 
comparatively weak. Therefore, there is a certain liberal and realist bias in force. It is not strong 
enough,  though,  to  challenge  the  holistic  philosophy  of  the  U.N.  With  the  Millennium 
Development Goals, there is even more reason to downplay the narrow features as a legacy from 
the  Cold  War  era,  meaning  that  the  U.N.  is  now  clearly  geared  towards  the  objective  of 
remedying any remaining imbalance in practice.
40 
The U.N.’s strategies constitute another testing stone. It appears that the leap from business 
management to international law requires methodological adjustments. E.g., the U.N. does not 
approach  their  constituency  with  a  view  to  dividends  on  stock  or  profit-maximization. 
Furthermore, as a not-for-profit organization, the stakeholders that first and foremost deserve 
consideration are the victims of serious human rights violations, the worst-off in other words. 
Regarding  these,  jus  cogens  crimes  make  a  narrow  analogy  to  customer  satisfaction  both 
superfluous and offensive. The U.N. simply cannot provide the remedies for restoration unless, of 
course, it is able to un-do the original situation – something which is not in the organization’s 
power.  That  said,  the  emphasis  on  prevention  as  a  strategy  can  be  described  as  a  kind  of 
compromise. For example, while it is not possible to bring human beings back from the dead, the 
loss of life can be avoided through security-enhancing measures, thereby protecting a priceless 
stake. 
Interestingly enough, Annan, mixes traditional and modern views in a fashion that does not 
upset the organization’s amicable policy, which constitutes another broad feature. To the extent 
that he reports on the assumption that the U.N. exists to promote peace and security and that 
                                                           
39 Theodor Meron, Human Rights in International Law, 1984, 209.  
40 Note that he Millennium Development Goals highlight the right to not live in extreme poverty. See Annan, We The 
Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21
st. Century, 2000.  
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justice  is  instrumental  for  peace  and  justice,  the  view  is  traditional.  By  viewing  economic 
inequities as “root causes” of the failed state, however, Annan makes it hold that a stakeholder 
deal is void, perhaps even fraudulent, without protection of economic/social rights.
41 By virtue of 
the Great Emphasis he puts on these, Annan must be said to have socialized the mission with a 
progressive  brush  stroke  that  goes  beyond  the  (broad)  interdependency  clause  for  rights. 
However, while economic/social rights should be accommodated as constants in the justice 
equation, no politically radical strategies for change are proposed, that is, ones that would 
actually tilt the weight-scales between wealthy and poor countries. To accomplish this, Annan 
would have had to, as a minimum, address the fact that, according to international law, 
cooperation is based “upon the principle of mutual benefit”.
42 Therefore, if the requirement – on 
behalf of richer states – is that there is something monetary “in it” for us, rendering aid and 
assistance reduces to a narrow business deal. Rather than a revolutionary approach, Annan could 
have  restricted  the  meaning  of  “mutual  benefit”  to  “protection  of  reciprocal  stakes”  and, 
consequently, avoided the risk of capitalist greed in those post-conflict situations that typically 
give rise to marketplace bargaining involving profit in return for humanity. Checks-and-balances 
and,  for  the  purpose  of  regulating  the  exchange  or  transaction  in  accordance  with  moral 
principles, income limits for financial institutions or private contractors who operate in post-
conflict situations would have been a requirement, though. To take advantage of humanitarian aid 
and assistance is to contradict that same effort. 
 
V. Challenges for Stakeholder Jurisprudence 
On comparison, broad stakeholder theory receives a higher compatibility score with the U.N. 
than  the  narrow  alternative.  The  application  of  the  stakeholder  terminology  (cf.  talk  about 
stakeholders),  therefore,  calls  for  a  philosophy  and  a  methodology  of  a  specific  kind.  More 
precisely, it calls for ideas that are anchored in humanism and universalism and strategies that put 
pragmatism in the service of idealism, meaning that business, law, government, politics, etc. 
should use human rights ethics as a measurement for legitimacy.  
As a general jurisprudence parameter for international law, broad stakeholder theory entails, 
inter  alia,  that  so-called  realpolitik  should  be  banned.  According  to  M.  Cherif  Bassiouni, 
realpolitik is first and foremost characterized as a willingness to sacrifice justice for the sake of 
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promoting  peace,  an  approach  that  narrow  stakeholder  theorists  embrace.
43  Besides  the 
(pragmatic) ineffectiveness cum impossibility of securing long-term peace without justice, the 
reasoning also draws on (idealistic) morality because accountability for past state failure is a goal 
by  analogy  to  a  Kantian  imperative.  It  follows  that  “justice  must  be  done”  has  to  be 
accommodated  as  a  non-negotiable  constant  in  the  post-conflict  equation.  That  granted,  the 
equation does contain some variables, first and foremost, the preferences of victims. Once again, 
however, the pull of the argument is more about idealism than pragmatism. Morally speaking, it 
is important to prevent secondary victimization, which would be the outcome in the event that the 
reasonable demands of victims are ignored. It should be added that the category of “reasonable 
demands”  may  include  subjective  and/or  relative  preferences,  which  still  comply  with  the 
requirements of humanism and universalism. Furthermore, given that international law allows 
certain loopholes that make fairness practically impossible, the U.N. comes under an obligation 
to  close  these.  If  biologists  like  Frans  de  Waal  are  correct  that  fairness  and  empathy  come 
naturally  for  primates  (human  as  well  as  non-human),  the  existing  law  has  to  be  deemed  a 
somewhat backwards technology which the organization must bring up to date, up to the relevant 
evolutionary stage that is.
44 Finally, the interdependency of economic systems in a global context 
should result in more than appeals to international solidarity.
45 A “conscience of mankind” forum 
like the U.N. would not  be able to  deliver broad stakeholder  responses  to  reality unless the 
membership is pre-committed as regards those values that bind at the level of humanity, dignity, 
respect, etc.  
Because a prior and voluntary surrender of national sovereignty, in the form of ratification or 
accession  to  a  treaty,  is  not  a  requirement  for  the  broad  notion  of  bindingness,  customary 
international  law  can  be  ascribed  status  as  law  proper  and  therefore  there  is  no  sharp  or 
significant distinction between law and morality, in contradistinction to the premises of legal 
positivism. At the same time, it is true that the normal practice of states, the traditional source of 
customary international law, is not something which per se can secure morality. Even if all states 
adhere to, for example, norm N as a legal fact, N may still be wrong as a moral norm. After this, 
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Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application, 2011, 16, 740.  
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the link between broad stakeholder theory and natural law means that the normal practice of 
states must give way to morality, to justice in other words. 
Unfortunately, recent developments in broad stakeholder theory put the credibility of the 
U.N.’s new jurisprudence parameter at a serious risk. While it remains true that the conceptual 
and normative framework contains an internal tension by virtue of the fact that it allows the 
individual to agree to a zero-protection situation, the recent developments in question qualify as 
clear instances of selling out to the other side.
46 Certainly, according to James A. Stieb, broad 
stakeholder  theory  is  “more  libertarian  and  free-market  than  is  often  thought”.
47  As  a 
consequence, it is bound to push the future of international law in a certain direction. 
The problem is that the “father of (broad) stakeholder theory”, namely R. Edward Freeman 
set out – in 2010 – to correct “misunderstandings and misuses of stakeholder theory”.
48 One of 
these  consists  in  the  absence  of  a  distinction  between  comprehensive  moral  doctrine  and 
stakeholder theory. In other words, it is incorrect (after all) to interpret broad stakeholder theory 
as synonymous with a program of principled management. In this manner, Freeman indisputably 
broadens  the  distance  between  stakeholder  theory  and  the  mission  of  the  U.N.,  namely  to 
promote peace and security through justice, through recognition and protection of civil/political 
as well as economic/social human rights. Furthermore, stakeholder theory, so Freeman insists, 
“contains no requirement that the law be changed… to practice it [stakeholder theory]” for there 
is apparently enough of a fit between the two spheres to make this superfluous.
49 It follows that 
stakeholder theorists – in 2010 – are deliberately choosing to follow a pragmatic agenda, away 
from any affiliation with reformists. In addition, stakeholder theory anno 2010 presupposes “a 
system of voluntary exchange for individuals within a capitalist economy”, a fact that makes it 
absurd to even consider other systems because “it is decidedly not a form of socialism”.
50  
Needless  to  say,  the  above-mentioned  recent  developments  cannot  but  create  so  much 
common ground with the narrow version that the distinction between them seems to disappear. 
In  the  light  of  this,  the  question  of  whether  the  U.N.  should  discontinue  any  affiliation 
presents itself, especially since Annan’s successor as Secretary-General of the U.N., Ban Ki-
Moon talks more frequently and elaborately about stakeholders.
51 
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Weighing the pros and cons is a process that may lead to two outcomes. Either the U.N. 
chooses to reject stakeholder theory, arguing that too much is at stake for the organization. For 
example,  justice  defined  as  a  concept  of  right  that  is  not  necessarily  determined  by  legally 
codified norms has historically functioned as a platform for substantial and positive change.
52 
Therefore, it does not make sense for U.N. justice managers to accept set -backs to their own 
ethics-enhancing methodology. Alternatively, the organization decides to separate stakeholder 
theory and business management theory, so as to be able to build on the original framework, 
which Freeman outlined in 1984. After all, this was the one that inspired Annan to apply the 
stakeholder terminology in the first place.
53 
Even in the event that the U.N. decides to build on the original framework, the organization 
is well-advised to, in one sense, begin with the beginning, that is, to make an assessment of the 
terminology of stakeholders. The transition from Annan to Ki -Moon is really one from what 
might  be  described  as  a  ”tacit  conversion”,  with  few  and  scattered  pieces  of  evidence  that 
subsequently have to be inserted into a theoretical mould to try for fit, to a much more “officially 
confirmed  jurisprudence  parameter”.  However,  that  which  Ki-Moon  has  embraced  with 
enthusiasm, namely the stakeholder terminology, remains “naked” as far as its substance and 
implications are concerned. This is to say that no philosophical reflections appear to accompany 
it. 
That granted, a “common tongue” removes a traditional human rights obstacle, namely that 
the  values  that  unite  or  separate  constituencies  drown  in  misconceptions  about  the  values 
themselves. For example, the assumption has too often been that it is because “we” are different 
from “them” in respect to features like gender, religion, ethnicity, etc., that it is either difficult or 
impossible  to  come  to  share  values.  (Human  rights,  therefore,  exist  to  grant  everybody  the 
freedom to subscribe to values of their own choice as individuals, groups, peoples, countries and 
states.) The stakeholder terminology, however, reverses that logic in the sense that it is now made 
to hold that constituencies are established on the basis of values that are shared by stakeholders 
of  different  gender,  religion,  ethnicity,  etc.  (The  terminology  of  stakeholders,  therefore, 
presupposes the justice of the standard distribution of human rights, but focuses attention on a 
communality  of  values.)  In  and  of  itself,  this  fact  de-dramatizes  the  traditional  controversy 
pertaining to cross-cultural and transnational responsibilities. While it is true that the U.N. has a 
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reputation for being a carrier of Western values, it is equally true that the cornerstones of a global 
consensus and community have already been inserted into the foundation in the form of basic 
needs. If human rights are extended to preferences for fulfillment of these needs, diversity will 
still not pose a threat to humanity. Even the U.N.’s talk about “freedom from want” is anchored 
in common interests.
54 It is not until want is disconnected from fundamental freedom and welfare 
that values come into conflict. The question is if the human rights -terminology should be 
discontinued at this point because there simply is not enough at stake to warrant its application? 
To those who m ay maintain that “This is all an instance of the Emperor’s new clothes”, the 
answer is: not on broad stakeholder premises whereby a stake imputes no sharp or significant 
distinction  between  self  and  others.  By  definition,  a  stake  presupposes  that  we  are  “in  it” 
together.  X-values  affect  or  is  affected  by  Y-values,  and  vice  versa.  Under  stakeholder 
jurisprudence, pure subjectivism and relativism do not exist for the same reason. This raises 
another question, viz., should it be mandatory for individuals and groups to practice conformity 
with their own declared values, not for the purpose of avoiding an accusation of hypocrisy, but 
because of the relationship with others. If the X-constituency thinks nothing much of their “own” 
values and therefore neglects these, it follows that that same constituency thinks nothing much of 
those other stakeholders who are affected in the process, which is a humiliation of course. For the 
same reason, autonomy and heteronomy have to be re-thought so as to reflect the (invariant) 
interdependency.  Furthermore,  a  strong  de-emphasis  on  national  sovereignty  entails  that,  per 
Annan, “displaced persons and refugees” and indeed stateless persons, who have been victimized 
in the process of political tyranny or war, qualifies as stakeholders solely on account of the way 
they think things should be, in essence, the best resolution to a conflict that they are affected by. 
If  stakeholders  are  oriented  toward  agency  (cf.  affect)  rather  than  a  passive  entitlement  (cf. 
affected  by),  the  assumption  is  that  their  mindset  is  proactive  and  geared  toward  a  win-win 
situation, again on account of interdependency. In the case of the world-wide recession, this may 
have far-reaching implications, some of which could potentially revolutionize the U.N.’s policy 
of  adjudication.  For  example,  Afghanistan  continues  to  rank  173  on  the  Global  Index  after 
decades of failure. This does not raise the traditional question of the political will. Instead, it 
raises  the  question  of  whether  the  U.N.  is  actually  aware  of  the  wrongdoing  it  is  allowing, 
according to broad stakeholder jurisprudence?  
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Perhaps what is most needed is an update of the education of professional justice managers 
so that they are made familiar with the challenges that they are in fact facing as a consequence of 
having converted to talk about stakeholders? 
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